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American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 46, Number 4, October 2009 
“OuGhT,” “CAN,” AND PRACTICAL ReAsONs 
Clayton Littlejohn 
Many accept the principle that states that “ought” implies “can”: 
OIC: s ought to √ only if s can √.1 
As intuitive as OIC might seem, we should acknowledge that the arguments offered in its support 
often do not warrant the sort of confidence many of us have in the principle. For example, friends 
of OIC often say that the principle is needed to explain certain lin- guistic behaviors.2 suppose 
smith sees Jones sitting in a chair and Jones tells smith that he has just been robbed. “you ought to 
call the police,” says smith. When Jones tells him that he cannot because he has been tied to the 
chair, it is natural for smith to recommend some alternative course of action. The reason, some 
say, is that in learning that Jones cannot get out of his chair to call the police, smith learns from 
this alone that his initial remark was mistaken. In saying, “you ought to ask someone to help untie 
you,” he recommends an alternative course of action and tries to correct his first remark. 
If only it were this simple. some chalk this up to conversational implicature. In discovering that 
his advisee cannot follow his advice, his offer of additional advice is proper because when we say 
someone ought to perform such and such an action, we would violate conversational maxims if 
we advise someone to perform an action knowing they 
will not follow this advice.3 Although the details of such proposals have been criticized, it is 
unlikely that we need OIC to explain smith’s linguistic behavior.4 Let us change examples. having 
untied Jones, smith heads with Jones to the hardware store. In addition to getting new locks for 
his doors, Jones had promised his mother that he would spruce up the place. “you ought to buy 
some tile for the kitchen and leave the living room as is,” says smith. Jones says that he is 
unwilling to leave the living room walls the same drab color they are now. “In that case, you 
should paint the walls yellow,” says smith. As before, it seems that smith will advise a new 
course of action in learning something about Jones. In the previous case, learning that Jones is 
incapable of leaving his chair leads smith to advise Jones to call for assistance, creating the 
appearance that he has taken back his original advice, having recognized that it was mistaken. 
having urged him to call the police initially, he advises him instead to ask some- one to untie him. 
In this case, learning that Jones is unwilling to leave the living room the same drab color leads 
smith to advise Jones to paint the walls yellow despite his previous advice to refrain from 
painting the walls. No one thinks that the proper explanation of this second bit of linguistic 
behavior appeals to the principle that “ought” implies “is willing.” Given the obvious parallels 
between the two 
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cases and the utter implausibility of the thesis that “ought” implies “is willing,” it is unlikely that 
the case for OIC can be made simply on the basis of linguistic considerations. 
Rather than try to establish OIC on the basis of these sorts of linguistic considerations, some have 
argued that the principle follows from some relatively uncontroversial claims about reasons for 
action. We can state the latest argument for OIC as follows: 
(1) If s ought to √, s has reason to √. (2) Ifshasareasonto√,√-ingisapo- 
tential action of s’s.5 (3) If √-ing is a potential action of s’s, s 
can √. (C) If s ought to √, s can √. 
In support of the argument’s crucial premise, (2), Vranas remarks: 
[This premise] holds because reasons of any kind are conceptually linked to objects of the given kind: 
reasons for belief to potential be- liefs, reasons for action to potential actions, and so on. . . . To my ears 
[(2)] has an almost tauto- logical ring: how could reasons for action—as opposed to e.g., reasons for 
belief—fail to be conceptually linked to potential actions?6 
It seems Vranas takes (2) to be a truism about practical reasons. While his question is not without 
rhetorical force, we shall see that what Vranas takes to be a truism about reasons for action is not 
true. For his part, streumer suggests that if we deny (2), we no longer have a principled reason for 
rejecting talk of crazy reasons. For example, if reasons are not simply reasons to perform 
potential actions or actions the agent has the ability and opportunity to perform, we have no 
reason to say it is impossible for smith to have reason to travel back in time to prevent the 
crusades.7 Because talk of crazy reasons is crazy talk, such talk is best avoided, as are views that 
encourage it. 
The aim of this paper is to show that this latest line of argument for OIC fails. In argu- ing that 
the argument fails, we shall see that 
the reasons given for rejecting the argument are reasons friends of OIC have no prin- cipled 
reason to reject. There are two things to note about the argument for OIC. First, it seems that in 
specifying the truth-conditions for claims about what an agent can do, we have to take account of 
features of the cir- cumstances the agent is in or is described as being in. While there are 
circumstances under which Jones steps out of a chair, in the situation described where Jones is 
bound to the chair by knots he cannot untie, we speak falsely if we say “Jones can get out of the 
chair to call the police.” According to (3), the actions an agent can perform in a given set of 
circumstances is a subset of potential actions, which we might think of as actions the agent has 
both the ability and opportunity to perform. According to (2), there cannot be a reason for an 
agent to perform an action in circumstances where that action is not among the potential actions 
of the agent (i.e., actions the agent has both the ability and opportunity to perform or, simply, can 
perform). In short, just as the truth-conditions for the claim “s can √” ought to refer to the 
circumstances in which s is found or is described as being, the truth-conditions for claims about 
which actions are potential actions of s’s and what actions s has reason to do ought to refer to 
these same circumstances. If it is possible for circumstances to arise where s has reason to √ but 
lacks either the ability or opportunity to √, (2) is false. 
second, note that in formulating OIC, “ought” is taken to correspond to all things considered 
obligations and not to prima facie duties. This restriction is not unmotivated. It seems that prima 
facie obligations behave in ways that all things considered obligations do not.8 Whereas it seems 
friends of OIC would never say that an agent can be under a pair of incompatible all things 
considered obligations, it seems there is nothing to OIC that compels them to deny the possibility 
of conflicting prima facie obligations. If prima 
facie duties can arise in circumstances where corresponding all things considered obliga- tions 
cannot, it seems that an obvious strategy for arguing against (2) would be to show that just as 
prima facie duties are not subject to the same limiting conditions as all things considered 
obligations, the same holds true for the reasons associated with these duties. such an argument 
would not necessarily give us any reason to reject OIC, so friends of OIC should not be terribly 
surprised by such an argument. In what follows, we shall see that an example involving 
conflicting prima facie obligations causes trouble for (2), the crucial assumption in the argument 
for OIC. 
Jones is asked to give alms for the poor. Fishing around in his pockets, he realizes that he has 
spent the last of his alms on coffee and cigarettes. he does have a pocketknife. he knows he could 
chase down a passerby, kill him for his alms, and distribute those alms to the poor. On the one 
hand, reasons associated with the duty of beneficence are reasons for him to give alms to the 
poor. On the other hand, considerations of justice and reasons associated with the duty of 
nonmaleficence give Jones good reason to refrain from mur- dering the passerby. As conflicts of 
duty go, this one is not terribly hard to resolve. The interesting question is not a question about 
what Jones should do. The interesting ques- tion is whether the reasons Jones has are rea- sons for 
potential actions of his. We shall see that in these circumstances he has practical reasons that are 
not reasons for actions that are potential actions of his. 
suppose we say: 
(4) ThereisareasonforJonestogivealms to the poor. 
If there is a prima facie duty of beneficence, it seems (4) is true. It also seems plausible to say two 
further things about this example: 
(5) The reason Jones has for giving alms to the poor (i.e., the reason associated with the duty of 
beneficence) is not a 
reason that has among its demands that Jones does whatever is necessary given the circumstances 
to give alms to the poor, such as acting unjustly or against the reasons associated with the duty of 
nonmaleficence. 
It seems plausible to maintain that in the cir- cumstances described, the reason Jones has for 
helping the poor is not a reason to murder the passerby and take his alms to distribute to others, 
even though there is no potential action of Jones’s that is his giving alms to the poor without his 
murdering the passerby to get the alms to distribute. 
To see that this claim is not without its motivation, suppose Jones performs the un- speakable act. 
Jones murders the passerby and offers the dead man’s alms to the poor. We would say that 
Jones’s action was all things considered wrong. Would we say that he nevertheless did what the 
reason associated with the duty of beneficence asked of him? Foot apparently thought not: 
Certainly benevolence does not require unjust action, and we should not call an act which violated rights an 
act of benevolence. It would not, for instance, be an act of benevolence to induce cancer in one person (or 
deliberately to let it run its course) even for the sake of alleviat- ing much suffering.9 
If Jones’s killing the man and distributing the alms is not an action that does what the reasons 
associated with the duty of benefi- cence would have him do, then we should not say that in doing 
this deed Jones would have done what an overridden reason would have him do. someone might 
reject (5) on the grounds that the reason associated with the duty of beneficence is cancelled 
rather than overridden. Or, they might object that in running this argument we are assuming that 
in stating principles of prima facie duty we cannot use ceteris paribus clauses.10 Against the 
suggestion that the reason is cancelled and the duty of beneficence is only a conditional 
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duty, note that in the example described it is reasonable for Jones to regret that he could not give 
alms to help the poor. If, however, the reason to help were cancelled because the duty of 
beneficence is but a conditional duty, it is hard to see how it could be reasonable for Jones to 
regret this. suppose as Jones were fishing around in his pockets, smith appeared and gave his alms 
to the poor. It might be that smith’s gift was so generous that there is no further need for 
assistance. In this circum- stance, there is nothing for Jones to regret. The reason for Jones to help 
is cancelled rather than overridden and the condition nec- essary for the existence of a duty of 
Jones’s to help no longer satisfied. The natural expla- nation as to why it is reasonable for Jones 
to regret not helping in the first example, but not the second, is that there was a noncancelled 
reason for Jones to help in the first example only.11 That there is such a reason, however, indicates 
that the duty of beneficence is not a duty conditional on the absence of duties that give overriding 
reasons to make it all things considered wrong for Jones to help. Moreover, the argument does not 
assume that statements of principle of prima facie duty do not contain ceteris paribus clauses. It 
merely assumes that such clauses do not rule out the very possibility of conflicts of prima facie 
duty. If one were to insist that such clauses do rule out this possibility, one would have to explain 
the rationality of Jones’s regret in the absence of any moral residue. This residue is often taken to 
indicate the presence of an overridden reason. 
Depending on how we filled out the details of the example, we might have set it up in such a way 
that Jones’s killing the passerby and distributing his alms to the poor was op- timific. We might 
have set up the example in such a way that the reasons associated with a crude version of the 
greatest happiness prin- ciple and the reasons associated with the duty of beneficence would be 
reasons for Jones to give alms to the poor. We should note that 
these reasons are similar in certain respects, but are not the very same reasons. One reason to 
think that the utilitarian conception of be- neficence and the benevolent act is perverse is 
precisely because the reason the utilitarian says Jones has is a reason to promote the welfare of 
others by any means necessary. If, however, the utilitarian is wrong about what the duty of 
beneficence truly demands of us, we might appeal to (5) in an attempt to explain the mistake. The 
reason that Foot and others think the utilitarian view is repugnant is precisely because the reasons 
the utilitar- ian says we have to promote welfare are the kinds of reasons that can serve as reasons 
to perform unjust and brutal actions if the circumstances are such that such brutal and unjust 
actions are necessary for the promotion of welfare. If those reasons were associated with the duty 
of beneficence, it seems that we would say that just as there is no duty to bring our actions in line 
with the greatest happiness principle, the duty of beneficence is no more a duty than the duty to 
be chaste or the duty to refrain from being uppity are duties. These are not genuine duties because 
they tell us we have reasons we know there could not be. The reasons associated with the duty of 
beneficence, assuming there is such a thing, distinguish themselves from the reasons associated 
with the greatest happiness principle precisely because they ask us to promote welfare without 
thereby asking us to ignore considerations of justice. To anthro- pomorphize a bit, the reason 
associated with the duty of beneficence might remind you on occasion that it had asked you to 
give alms to the poor, but it would never confess to being a tad disappointed that you did not 
murder to do it, even if that would have been necessary for securing the alms for distribution. 
someone might insist that it would be impossible for our duty of beneficence to demand that 
Jones give alms to the poor without thereby demanding that Jones do whatever must be done to 
give alms to the 
poor. They might concede that (4) is intuitive when considered in isolation. They might concede 
that (5) is plausible for precisely the sort of reasons that Foot offers. however, they will insist that 
while these claims might be plausible taken independently, they are jointly inconsistent. It is a 
general principle, they mightsay,thatifRisareasonforsto√inC, and ¬-ing is the sole means by 
which s might √inC,Risareasonto¬inC.Thereason might be a prima facie reason only, but there 
must be this reason. similarly, if s is forced to choose between √-ing and ¬-ing, R is a 
reasonforsto√inConlyifRisareason to refrain from ¬-ing in C.12 so, in the case at hand, insofar as 
the duty of beneficence says that there is a reason to give alms that can be given only if Jones 
kills the passerby, it is a reason to murder or not refrain from murdering. We cannot have it both 
ways. 
This line of objection seems mistaken. suppose Jones is out for his morning consti- tutional when 
he sees a man has just fallen into the river. seeing the man struggle to pull himself to shore and 
knowing that he is in serious danger of being pulled away from the bank, Jones has a reason to 
lend the man a hand. The next day smith heads down this same path on the way to meet his friend 
Jones as he has promised to do. smith sees a man has just fallen into the river. seeing the man 
struggle to pull himself to shore and knowing that he is in serious danger of being pulled away 
from the bank, smith has a reason to lend the man a hand. In general, the strength of the case for 
√-ing will be a function of both the reasons that favor √-ing and the reasons that speak against √-
ing. It seems that the case for smith to assist and for Jones to assist are equally strong. If this is 
right, it follows that the reasons that smith had for keeping his appointment with Jones were not 
reasons to refrain from helping the man. The reason associated with the duty of fidelity did not 
have among its demands the demand that smith refrain from helping the man in 
the river, even though the circumstances were such that smith could not help without missing his 
appointment and failing to keep his promise. so, it seems that the assumption needed to show that 
(4) is incompatible with (5)(i.e.,thatifRisareasonforsto√inC,R is a reason to refrain from 
performing actions incompatible with √-ing in C) is false. 
We can now state the argument against (2). According to (2), it can only be that (4) and (5) are 
true in circumstances where a potential action of Jones’s is giving alms to the poor without 
murdering someone to secure those alms. Given the circumstances, however, this is not a 
potential action of Jones’s. he does not have the ability and opportunity to assist the poor without 
first killing the passerby. so, it seems that a defense of (2) requires one to choose between two 
options. First, in de- fending (2) someone can accept (5) and then deny that a pair of 
(nonconditional) prima facie duties places incompatible demands on Jones. either there is no 
reason to assist or no reason not to murder. In saying this, one must explain how it could be 
reasonable for Jones to regret not being able to help the poor or deny that such regret is 
reasonable. Insofar as it seems that Jones’s regret is reasonable, explaining that regret involves 
recognizing a kind of moral residue, and understanding that residue requires us to acknowledge 
that there is an overridden reason rather than a cancelled one, this option is not attractive. 
Alternatively, someone can accept (4) while denying (5). One can thump the table and insist that 
the duty of beneficence does have among its demands the demand that we kill strangers with an 
eye towards helping others and insist that we really have prima facie reason to do this. The 
problem with either response is that a description of our case that accommodates (4) and (5) 
allows us to say much of what we want to say about the case and is not obviously incoherent. 
That this description is incompatible with (2) suggests that (2) is hardly the truism that Vranas 
made 
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it out to be. Moreover, this description of the example suggests that the kinds of reasons we need 
to cause trouble for (2) are not the sorts of reasons that would lead one to question OIC. All that 
is needed are reasons associated with prima facie duties. 
The argument’s crucial premise and, ar- guably, its Achilles’ heel, asserts that we can have 
reasons only to perform potential actions. Given that any potential action of ours is an action we 
can perform, the circumstance-relativity of claims about what we “can” do force us to say that an 
action is a potential action of ours only in circum- stances where we can perform that action. In 
turn, the argument works only if reasons are reasons only under those circumstances where we 
could perform the actions for which they serve as reasons. If, as has been argued, we have reasons 
to √ in circum- stances where we lack the opportunity or ability to √, we ought to reject (2). 
Vranas thought that (2) was a sort of truism about practical reasons. The question, “how could 
reasons for action—as opposed to, e.g., reasons for belief—fail to be conceptually linked to 
potential actions?” has rhetorical force, but we shall see that we can deny (2) while allowing that 
there is some conceptual connection between reasons for action and potential actions even if (2) 
is false. More- over, if favorers constitute practical reasons, we have little reason to think (2) 
captures some important truth about those reasons. Let us consider these points further. 
Note that the conceptual connection be- tween reasons for action and potential actions needed for 
the argument is a strong one. To avoid having to say that there can be reasons for an agent to √ in 
circumstances in which the agent cannot √, we had to assume that there can only be reason for an 
agent to √ in some set of circumstances if √-ing is a potential action of the agent’s in those very 
circumstances. We can say that there is a conceptual connection between reasons for 
action and potential actions if we simply went with the weaker claim that s can have reason to 
√ only if there is some circumstance or other in which √-ing is a potential action of the agent’s.13 
In our examples, there was a reason for Jones to give alms to the poor. While Jones’s reason was 
not a reason for him to do what was necessary to give alms to the poor in those circumstances and 
his heeding the duty of beneficence was not a potential action of his, there may well be other 
circumstances in which Jones’s heeding this duty was something he could have done if he only 
tried. Thus, even if we were to agree that only by linking practical reasons with poten- tial actions 
could we distinguish reasons for action from reasons for belief, we still have no reason to think 
this connection is properly described by (2). Indeed, we have reason to think it is not. 
Recall that in his defense of the argument’s crucial premise, streumer claims that if we sever the 
connection between the conditions under which we have reasons to √ from the circumstances in 
which we can √, we will have no principled reason to deny the pos- sibility of “crazy reasons,” 
such as the reason we have to travel back in time to stop the spread of the black plague or (worse) 
stop the spread of the plague without bothering to time travel. Note that the cases we used to 
cause trouble for (2) were not crazy reasons. They were the sorts of reasons we often have when 
we find ourselves conflicted between two attractive courses of action, only one of which we can 
pursue. It seems that if we weaken the connection between reasons for action and potential 
actions in the way just suggested, we have seen there is at least one principled way of denying (2) 
without thereby allowing for the possibility of such crazy rea- sons. Given that there is a world of 
difference between the case that causes trouble for (2) and the cases of crazy reasons, it seems 
that even if this principle proved too weak or too strong there would be many more candidates 
to consider before concluding that we have to choose between accepting (2) or recognizing crazy 
reasons as reasons. 
Perhaps we should have been skeptical of (2) from the start. Consider the view that considerations 
that count in favor of an action constitute reasons for that action.14 If a con- sideration can stand in 
this favoring relation to some action and thereby constitute a reason for performing that action 
even if that action is not an action the agent has the opportunity or ability to perform, then we 
should reject (2). We shall see that it is not implausible to maintain that considerations that 
constitute reasons can stand in this favoring relation, even if the thing the reason favors is not a 
po- tential action of the agent’s. To see this, let us suppose actions are coarse-grained items that 
are tokens of a variety of act-types.15 On this picture, Jones’s returning smith’s book might be 
Jones’s keeping a promise to a friend, his disappointing his sister who had hoped to read the book 
by the pool, and his burning fossil fuels as he drives to smith’s apartment on the far side of town. 
On the view that rea- sons are favorers, that his returning the book would enable him to keep his 
promise, is a reason because it makes the action favorable. Combine this with the view that 
practical reasons are only reasons for potential actions. There is no potential action of Jones’s that 
is his returning the book that is not his disap- pointing his sister and burning fossil fuels. so, the 
consideration that speaks in favor of returning the book can only do so by count- ing in favor of, 
inter alia, his disappointing his sister, his burning fossil fuels, and his keeping a promise to smith. 
The trouble for this view emerges when we see that the view commits us to saying that if there is 
a reason for Jones to keep his promise, there is thereby a reason for his disappointing of his sister 
and his burning of fossil fuels. however, there seems to be nothing in the circumstance that favors 
disappointing his sister or burning the fossil fuels. There seems to be no contradic- 
tion and no mistake in Jones’s saying, “Look, there was no reason to upset my sister, but it was 
unavoidable since I had to return smith’s book.” The claim would express a conceptual falsehood 
if practical reasons were reasons only for potential actions. 
Contrast this with the view on which favor- ers are taken to be practical reasons, but rea- sons are 
understood as related to something less coarse-grained than token actions of an indefinite number 
of types, such as actions under specific descriptions or aspects of ac- tions. On such a view, 
Jones’s reason has only to do with the fact that the book is returned rather than any particular 
token that is an instance of book returning, promise keeping, fossil fuel burning, and sister 
upsetting. such a view seems better suited for making sense of two features of our practical 
situation. First, think about the phenomenon of rational regret. An agent might rationally regret 
that she did not √, knowing that she ought all things considered to have ¬’d and knowing that she 
could not both √ and ¬. The natural explanation as to why an agent might ratio- nally regret that 
she did not perform an action she knows she ought not to have performed is that there was 
something lacking from her ¬-ing that spoke in favor of her √-ing.16 If that consideration which 
spoke in favor of her √-ing gave her no reason to act at all, her regret is hard to make sense of. On 
the view that reasons are reasons only for potential actions, given that she knows that she could 
not have √’d without thereby doing what she ought all things considered not have done, she could 
only judge that there was reason for her to √ in those circumstances if the defeated reason was, 
inter alia, a reason to do what she should not all things considered do. But then she should not 
regret that she could not have acted on that reason. 
second, the view seems better placed to make sense of the observation that practi- cal reasoning is 
non-monotonic. To say that practical reasoning is non-monotonic is to 
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say that a piece of practical reasoning that proceeds from a set of premises to a conclu- sion might 
be perfectly acceptable even if that reasoning would not have been acceptable if additional 
premises were added.17 suppose Jones were to reason initially as follows: If I head to smith’s this 
afternoon, I could re- turn his book and keep my promise, so this is what I shall do. he then 
realizes that if he put this plan into action and returned the book, he would disappoint his sister 
and that the disappointment would be so great that he thinks it might be best just to return the 
book a few days later than promised. (Assume that she really wants to read the book and smith 
will not be terribly upset by Jones’s failure to keep his promise.) If there was nothing wrong with 
the initial inference, but there would be something wrong with Jones’s inferring that he should 
return the book in light of the new information, practical reasoning is non- monotonic. If reasons 
only stood in relation to potential actions, it is difficult to see how this case could illustrate the 
non-monotonicity of practical reasoning. Remember that his keeping his promise would be a way 
of doing something he should all things considered not do and that if this case illustrates the non-
monotonicity of practical reasoning, his initial inference would have to be a good one. Assuming 
that reasons are reasons only for potential actions of his, we would either have to say that the fact 
that his action would fulfill his promise would speak in favor of disappointing his sister terribly 
or that Jones has just discovered a further fact in light of which the fact that his action would be 
neces- sary for fulfilling his promise should not have 
figured in deliberation as a consideration that spoke in favor of returning the book. As the fact 
that the action would keep the promise does not speak in favor of disappointing his sister, we 
would have to say that Jones was initially unaware of a fact in light of which the consideration he 
took to favor return- ing the book was no reason at all. With no reason favoring the initial 
decision to return the book, our first case does not provide an example in which a bit of practical 
reasoning is good even if that reasoning would have been bad had additional reasons been 
brought to bear. If, as seems to be the case, there are two features of our practical situation that 
seem to make sense only if reasons stand in relation to features of actions we contemplate 
performing rather than potential actions, we have two theoretical reasons to doubt (2) in addition 
to the doubts generated by the ex- ample discussed earlier. 
While OIC continues to strike many of us as obvious, it seems yet another attempt to justify the 
obvious has met with failure. The latest argument for OIC sought to establish that principle on the 
basis of relatively un- controversial claims about reasons for action. It turns out that these claims 
are not merely subject to controversy. upon close inspection, it seems that they are false. Practical 
reasons need not be reasons for potential action in the strong sense needed for this argument to 
work. since we can have reasons to perform actions under circumstances where we cannot 
perform those actions, we again have to look elsewhere for an argument for OIC. 
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‘OuGhT,’ ‘CAN,’ AND PRACTICAL ReAsONs / 371 1. The “ought” under consideration is the all 
things considered ought. It does not correspond to merely 
prima facie obligations. 2. For a recent example of this, see howard-snyder (2006, p. 236). 
3. see sinnott-Armstrong (1984) for a defense of the view that “ought” merely conversationally implies 
“can.” 
4. streumer (2003) criticizes sinnott-Armstrong’s (1984) proposal, but the second example involving 
smith and Jones suggests that the problems with a pragmatic approach to these examples is a problem of 
detail rather than principle. Note that there is no inconsistency in offering a pragmatic treatment of these 
examples while accepting OIC. 
5. The notion of “potential action” is a technical one and as Vranas (2007, p. 169) explains it, √-ing 
can only be a potential action of s’s if s has both the ability and opportunity to √. As opportunity de- pends 
on circumstance, the truth-conditions for “s can √” must refer to the appropriate circumstances as well. The 
principal difference between Vranas’s argument for OIC and streumer’s (2007, p. 357) argument is that 
streumer speaks of “possible actions” rather than “potential actions.” On his view, √-ing is a possible action 
of s’s if either there is a nomologically possible and historically close world in which s √’s or a 
nomologically possible and historically accessible world in which s √’s. The subtle differences between 
potential and possible actions will not concern us here. Do note, however, that just as Vranas must say that 
the truth-conditions for “s can √” must refer to circumstances in which √-ing is a potential action of s’s, 
streumer must say that the truth-conditions for “s can √” must refer to circumstances in which √-ing is a 
possible action of s’s. Assuming (2), both authors must say that a reason for s to √ can be a reason only 
under certain circumstances (i.e., those in which s can √). 
6. Vranas (2007, p. 173). 7. streumer (2007, p. 361). 8. As noted by howard-snyder (2006, p. 234). 
9. Foot (1985, p. 205). 10. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising these possibilities. 
11. Both Ross (1930) and stocker (1990) rely on this sort of test for determining whether the reason 
associated with the prima facie duty was cancelled or whether the duty was conditional in such a way that it 
generated no reason in these circumstances. Both take the rationality of regret as an indication that the 
reason was not cancelled, the reason was in fact generated, and that if the duty is conditional, only the 
conditions necessary for the duty to apply to the agent nevertheless obtain. 
12. If we let “√” and “¬” denote omissions as well as actions, this follows from the previous claim. 
13. It was only after considering the comments of an anonymous referee that it was clear that someone 
could deny (2) while maintaining that some weaker connection between reasons for action and potential 
actions might exist. 
14. scanlon (1998) has done much to popularize the view that treats favorers as reasons. 
15. Goldman (1971) thinks of token actions as exemplifications of act-properties and denies that a single 
token action could exemplify a multitude of such properties. The point being made here does not assume 
that Goldman is wrong about the individuation of actions, but it is easier to state if we speak about actions 
as coarse-grained events as Davidson (1980) does. 
16. For further discussion of this point, see stocker (1990, p. 272). 17. see Kenny (1975, p. 90) for further 
discussion. 
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